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This paper explores the development of strategies by multinational corporations
(MNCs) for serving markets at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP). MNCs play
an important role in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formulated
by the United Nations (UN), as they are responsible for one-third of the total
economic output and the majority of world trade. However, little is known about
how MNCs contribute to meeting the UN SDGs. Through an in-depth analysis of
how Grundfos, a Danish MNC and a leading supplier of pumps, developed a solution
for supplying fresh potable water to rural villages in Kenya, we investigate some
challenges MNCs face and demonstrate the importance of intimate engagement with
the context of strategic action. Tackling sustainable development issues in the
context of BoP markets represents a distinctive challenge to MNCs, which often do
not have a good understanding of BoP environments. Drawing on contrasting ideas
of strategy as navigation or wayfaring, we highlight the dangers of trying to impose
existing strategies and business practices in market contexts, which are fundamen-
tally different from existing ones. We add to the existing research by exploring how
such frameworks interact with strategizing processes in a novel environment for the
operating firm. Specifically, we explore the interrelatedness between planned and
emergent approaches to strategizing in BoP market environments.
K E YWORD S
SDG goals, strategizing, sustainability and MNCs
1 | INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the development of strategies for markets at
the base of the economic pyramid (BoP) in developing countries.
Prahalad and Hammond (2002) argued that multinational corporations
(MNCs) could make a profit by selling to impoverished consumers at
the BoP and, at the same time, help alleviate poverty. That a signifi-
cant untapped opportunity for “doing well by doing good” exists
(Prahalad, 2004; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002) is an alluring
proposition that has led to thousands of corporate initiatives
(Hart, 2015). However, clear evidence that the BoP concept has
delivered on its promise to either businesses (in the form of profits) or
BoP participants (by alleviating poverty) is still lacking (Dembek,
Sivasubramaniam, & Chmielewski, 2019).
Initially, the BoP approach focused on selling to the poor. This
was seen as an opportunity to eradicate poverty and provide social
benefits to low-income populations in a culturally sensitive and
environmentally responsible manner (e.g., Hart & Milstein, 1999;
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Prahalad & Hart, 2002). There was severe criticism of this approach
for, among other things, encouraging poor consumers to spend their
limited funds on products that they might neither need nor be able to
afford (e.g., Karnani, 2006), displacing local producers (Garrette &
Karnani, 2010; Newell, 2008), obscuring unequal power relations and
conflicting agendas (Arora & Romijn, 2011), and being based in West-
ern ideals of growth and development (Landrum, 2007). A second iter-
ation of the BoP approach focused more on cocreating value with the
poor in ways that created value for all parties involved (Simanis &
Hart, 2008). However, the initial criticism is also pertinent to the sec-
ond iteration, and in recent years, the scope of the BoP approach has
been widened further to a more bottom-up approach to poverty alle-
viation that explicitly addresses sustainable development issues
(Cañeque & Hart, 2015; Dembek et al., 2019).
The attention of MNCs toward BoP markets is in alignment with
several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) formulated by
the United Nations (UN; Kolk, Kourula, & Pisani, 2017; United
Nations, 2015). MNCs are posited as being essential for achieving
the SDGs before 2030 as they are responsible for about one-third
of the total output and the majority of world trade (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008), although this pri-
vatization of poverty alleviation and development to MNCs is not
without detractors (Arora & Romijn, 2011; Karnani, 2007, 2011).
Therefore, MNCs are under pressure to find ways to unlock oppor-
tunities for joint wealth creation in the poorest countries (Muusten,
Rhyne, & Zheng, 2013), for instance, by using social intermediaries
to help address institutional gaps between formal and informal
markets and create mutual value by tackling the unique cultural,
economic, and social issues in local communities (Heuer, Khalid, &
Seuring, 2020).
We think that tackling poverty and development issues at the
BoP presents a distinctive challenge for bridging what is known and
unfamiliar across different strategic and operational contexts
(Schrader, Freimann, & Seuring, 2012). Strategic teams in MNCs are
often anchored in one strategy context while seeking to explore busi-
ness opportunities in another (Hart, Sharma, & Halme, 2016).
BoP market contexts are often not well understood by MNCs.
They are characterized by a “confluence of uncertainties”
(Viswanathan, Sreekumar, & Gau, 2018), where environmental issues
and the consequences of climate change intersect with political
uncertainty, absence of stable institutional frameworks, and techno-
logical change. Trying to engage with them from a distance while
working with people operating in local BoP contexts provides a
double-edged problem for the strategizing efforts of MNC venture
teams. Localized managers and managers at headquarters are
involved in different sets of practices, and their understandings
develop along different paths, putting a strain on the development of
mutual understandings of strategic priorities and contexts
(Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005; Michailova et al., 2017). Distant man-
agers risk overlooking what is particular and essential in these unfa-
miliar environments. This double-edged problem is quite common for
MNCs operating in different contexts and seeking to align under-
standings and create shared patterns of actions. Hence, BoP
initiatives must be socially embedded and developed iteratively
(Duke, 2016; Simanis & Hart, 2008), Thus, while many MNCs are
intrigued by the apparent business opportunities at the BoP, they
are increasingly aware of the complexity involved in exploring them
(Karamchandani, Kubzansky, & Lalwani, 2011).
In this paper, we build on the notion that preexisting managerial
frameworks in MNCs pose challenges for implementation (Halme,
Lindeman, & Linna, 2012; Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009). We add to the
existing research by exploring in detail how such frameworks interact
with strategizing processes in a BoP setting that is a novel context for
operating firms. Specifically, we want to explore the interrelatedness
between planned and emergent approaches to strategizing in BoP
market environments, discussed as “building” and “dwelling” perspec-
tives in the strategy literature (Chia & Holt, 2009).
To this end, we present a detailed case study of Danish pump
manufacturer Grundfos's expansion into the business of selling fresh
potable water in rural areas of Kenya. According to the UN (2019),
“more efficient use and management of water are critical to
addressing the growing demand for water, threats to water security
and the increasing frequency and severity of droughts and floods
resulting from climate change” (p. 12). Thus, providing access to safe
drinking water is part of one of the SDGs (SDG6: Ensure Availability
and Sustainability of Water Management and Sanitation for All), and it
requires developing innovative and sustainable business models in
transition and developing economies (Gebauer & Saul, 2014; Sousa-
Zomer & Miguel, 2018). We explore how Grundfos initially designed
the strategy of Grundfos LIFELINK and how it subsequently evolved
as a consequence of the strategic intent of Grundfos and, significantly,
the coping activities of different actors and interactions with stake-
holders in Kenya.
This research makes theoretical and practical contributions. Theo-
retically, we suggest viewing strategizing in BoP contexts as a process
of weaving, where engaging closely with the environment and differ-
ent strategic materials (ideas and resources) forms identities and strat-
egies. Metaphorically, rather than seeing strategy as a process of
puzzle solving to create a fit between the firm and its perceived envi-
ronment, strategizing becomes a continually evolving tapestry, where
new aspects of the environment are acknowledged and change the
operational order. This does not discard planned strategy approaches.
The creative tension between navigators and dwellers is crucial for
understanding the emergence of BoP strategies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, we
introduce a distinction between a building approach to strategy, in
which actors consciously construct maps or models of the world and
then act on them, and a dwelling approach, where actors in the pro-
cess of everyday practical coping ingeniously make small local adapta-
tions as they go along (Chia & Holt, 2009; Ingold, 2000). We then
discuss our methodology and proceed by presenting the case of Grun-
dfos LIFELINK to reflect and further develop on these issues. In the
final part, we discuss the lessons learned from the case study con-
cerning weaving sustainable strategies for BoP markets and their pos-
sible implications for management practice and theory in terms of
strategizing in unfamiliar environments.
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2 | NAVIGATING AND WAYFARING IN BOP
STRATEGIZING
For MNCs accustomed to operating in mature and familiar environ-
ments, pursuing business opportunities, and addressing poverty issues
in BoP markets, is a complex task (London & Hart, 2004; Sánchez &
Ricart, 2010). Authors disagree about whether entering emerging mar-
kets requires the reinvention of firm strategies (e.g., London &
Hart, 2004) or whether it can be accomplished by leveraging existing
capabilities and business models to new markets (e.g., Seelos &
Mair, 2007). The former perspective holds that business conditions
differ significantly, and existing practices must be fundamentally chan-
ged (Rivera-Santos & Rufín, 2010). In addition, existing practices and
tools for assessing business opportunities developed for a mature
market context often fail when applied to a BoP context due to
market-related barriers, barriers associated with the natural environ-
ment, insufficient physical infrastructure, and poor access to business
services that are generally taken for granted (Halme et al., 2012).
The latter perspective takes as a starting point the competitive and
tested superiority of existing MNC business practices and strategies
and assumes that MNCs can adjust these to the BoP context,
essentially diminishing qualitative differences in the natural and
socioeconomic environment (Acosta, Kim, Melzer, Mendoza, &
Thelen, 2011; Prahalad, 2004).
With the above considerations, a key question for MNCs
becomes what approach to follow when developing their strategies
in uncharted territories (Winterhalter, Zeschky, & Gassmann, 2016).
When thinking strategically, managers analyze their environments
and portray their organization as it might be some time in the
future; they then rationally judge the available means by which
the organization can best move from its existing state to a desired
one. Robert Chia and Robin Holt describe this as the building
approach to strategy and contrast it with the dwelling approach
(Chia & Holt, 2006, 2009; Chia & Rasche, 2010). This distinction
bears resemblance to Mintzberg's distinction between crafting and
planning approaches to strategic thinking (Mintzberg, 1987;
Whittington & Cailluet, 2008).
The building approach to strategy is “exemplified by the agent-
strategist consciously constructing mental representations and models
of the world and only then acting upon them” (Chia & Holt, 2009,
p. 133). In contrast, the dwelling mode “consists of local adaptations
and ingenuity in everyday practical coping” (p. 159). We contend that
the two approaches often coexist and interrelate. Moreover, when
operating in BoP contexts, the approaches to follow and the open-
endedness of potential outcomes, switching between these different
modes through mapping and planning, become particularly challeng-
ing. As inhabitants of the worlds they live in, strategists participate
“from within in the very process of the world's continual coming into
being” (Ingold, 2007, p. 81). Participation is “a matter of intervening in
the fields of force and flows of material wherein the forms of things
arise and are sustained” (Ingold, 2011, p. 178). The creativity of strate-
gists lies in the practice of strategizing itself, in their ability to work
things out as they go along.
2.1 | Building and navigating
The building mode presents strategy as a navigational process
involved in answering questions, such as “Where are we now?” and
“Where do we want to go?” (Chia & Holt, 2009). Answering these
questions involves the use of models, maps, and classifications that
“represent the topology of the strategic terrain to be negotiated”
(Chia & Holt, 2009, p. 160). Strategizers rely on mental models and
explicit organizational knowledge to analyze, plan, and act purpose-
fully toward predefined ends to maintain analytical scope and account
for limited information processing capacity (Hockerts, 2015). This
includes externalizing familiar forces of the environment, as these are
assumed to be already accounted for. Maps help to capture or
“freeze” a specific shared understanding in time (Weick &
Quinn, 1999). It facilitates the idea of collectively moving in the same
direction, justifies, imbues meaning to actions for stakeholders, and
legitimates the business ideas for a broader constituency
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Once strategizers have determined the
current position and the desired destination, then plotted the route
between them, it is assumed to be relatively straightforward to get
from A to B.
2.2 | Dwelling and wayfaring
In contrast to the separation of strategic analysis and action that char-
acterizes building and navigation approaches to strategy, the dwelling
and wayfaring perspective assumes that strategizers constitute and
codefine environments through complex responsive processes
(Chia & Rasche, 2010; Ingold, 2000; Stacey, 2007). Managers experi-
ence a progressional ordering of reality along a path of travel, with
objects falling into and out of sight as new vistas open up and others
close (Ingold, 2007). What they are, or what they can be, is something
that they continually shape through their interactions with the envi-
ronment (Ingold, 2011). Thus, stability and social order in the mind of
the manager are fundamentally about experience and movement.
Rules and representations compare with the map of an unfamiliar
environment; having learned to attend to the features of the land-
scape and position accordingly, this map can be discarded. According
to Ingold (2000), “The map can be a help in beginning to know the
country, but the aim is to learn the country, not the map” (p. 415).
Hence, the dwelling perspective assumes an ability to account for
unexpected events in the environment of the business strategizer at
the expense of more complex (and resource-consuming) information
processing (Hockerts, 2015).
From a dwelling perspective, actions can be purposive without
actors necessarily having an overall purpose in mind (Chia &
Holt, 2006; Dreyfus, 1991). Acting purposively is attempting to
resolve an immediate problem at hand or overcome an undesirable
situation without seeing this as directed toward some overall goal in
mind. This is in alignment with recommendations of MNCs crafting
locally responsive strategy approaches to maintain fittingness with
the local natural and sociocultural environments (Brozovic, 2020;
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Duke, 2016). In contrast, to act with a purpose is to act according
to a predefined desired outcome (like the building mode). Managers
can relate their experiences to others through narration. The joints,
splits, and interactions of the lines of the sketch map “indicate
which paths to follow, and which paths can lead you astray,
depending on where you want to go” (Ingold, 2007, p. 84). Sketch
maps are not supposed to represent a particular territory and
scarcely survive the immediate contexts of their products before
they are discarded (Ingold, 2007; Wood, 1993a). What we seek to
explore in the following is the interaction and possible trade-off
between the building and dwelling modes as the BoP strategy pro-
cess unfolds in an unfamiliar environment.
Whereas the building approach imbues strategizers with clarity of
purpose and alignment to strategic vision and mission, the dwelling
approach allows for emergence and local adjustment to the opera-
tional complexity of BoP environments, which is frequently under-
estimated by MNCs (London & Hart, 2004). There is a built-in tension
between the approaches. The building perspective offers actionable
simplicity at the expense of the dwelling perspective's ability to
account for and coevolve with emergence and environmental com-
plexity (Hockerts, 2015). There is a tendency to rank building and
planning concerning their ability to cope with environmental complex-
ity (Hockerts, 2015) or dismiss too formalistic approaches altogether
in favor of emergence and learning (Mintzberg, 1991). Rather than
seeing the perspectives as mutually exclusive, the assumption here is
that they provide two horns of an emerging strategic dialogue within
a complex organization, which more accurately portrays the processes
of MNCs' strategic engagement in unfamiliar environments, such as
BoP markets. In this case, strategists seek creative resolutions of the
tensions on an ongoing basis rather than revert to one or the other
(Angwin & Cummings, 2017; Cummings & Angwin, 2004).
3 | METHODOLOGY
This is an explorative single-case study of Grundfos LIFELINK. Case
selection followed three criteria: (1) it should be an example of an
MNC with active and committed involvement in fulfilling the SDG
goals; (2) it should target BoP markets; and (3) it should offer the
opportunity to study real-time strategizing processes. Grundfos
LIFELINK meets all three criteria. First, Grundfos acknowledges the
SDG targets in its vision statement. Together with a select group of
MNCs, such as Nestle and Unilever, the firm was awarded the World
Business and Development Award at the UN Conference for Sustain-
able Development, Rio + 20, in 2012. With LIFELINK, Grundfos has
set an example that can inspire other firms seeking to include SDG
targets in their strategic efforts. Second, Grundfos LIFELINK explicitly
targets BoP markets. Studying Grundfos LIFELINK will provide insight
into the processes and incidents that led to the formulation and imple-
mentation of a strategy for a BoP context. Finally, Grundfos has gen-
erously given us wide-ranging access, including allowing us to
interview key informants and analyze all relevant internal documents.
The transparency and openness of Grundfos have given us a unique
opportunity to study BoP strategizing efforts relevant to meeting
SDG goals in an MNC.
We followed the development of the Grundfos LIFELINK initia-
tive intensively from its inception until its operation stage as an inten-
sive single-case study. Later, the LIFELINK project was rolled back for
reasons related to the dynamics we uncover here, but this is beyond
the scope of the present contribution.
Explorative in-depth single-case studies of organizations like
Grundfos LIFELINK are useful for understanding the underlying pro-
cesses of change and dynamics in unfolding events (Pettigrew, 1997;
Yin, 2015). Furthermore, in-depth case studies are useful for produc-
ing the kind of concrete, context-dependent knowledge that is central
to human learning and knowing (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The generalization
of findings to a population of MNCs is not an option in a qualitative
study like this. Instead, analytical generalization, continually comparing
findings against the existing relevant discourses and findings reported
in the literature, is used (Yin, 2015).
3.1 | Data sources
The case was developed from multiple data sources, including inter-
views and various documentary sources. The first author conducted
15 semi-structured interviews and collected other primary data
through email conversations (see Table 1). Interlocutors were selected
based on the themes and issues that emerged during the interview
process, as well as to reflect different levels of influence and tasks in
the organization. For the initial interviews, an interview guide was
used, whereas follow-up interviews were more informal and based on
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previous talks. Besides interviews with managers from Grundfos
LIFELINK, we interviewed a marketing research manager operating in
Kenya and a technical engineer who took part in the technical devel-
opment of the LIFELINK system. Interviews were carried out in 2010,
when it was still unclear whether LIFELINK would end up as a success
or a failure, and again in 2013, when LIFELINK was widely recognized
as a success in the global business media and internally in Grundfos.
LIFELINK was, and still is, seen as a groundbreaking learning experi-
ence for building BoP market presence and achieving their SDG ambi-
tions (BBC World News, 2012; Grundfos, 2020a). This is important as
strategy processes are often studied retrospectively when the out-
comes are known. Interviews were taped and transcribed, following
the procedure of iterative transcription, reflection, and coding, as
suggested by grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Initial inter-
views spurred us toward other informants, and in several cases, we
conducted follow-up interviews to clarify issues or pursue leads that
emerged during coding.
In addition to conducting interviews, we gathered and coded
many documentary materials, including internal memos, company pre-
sentation materials, video footage from Kenyan villages, physical
objects, and intranet access to real-time data on pump site perfor-
mance. We used the interview and documentary data materials to
develop a baseline case, coauthored with one of the key informants
from the company.
3.2 | Analysis
Our analytical approach used “sequential mapping” to grasp processes
in their contexts (Halinen, Medlin, & Törnroos, 2012). We focus on
how the strategy of Grundfos LIFELINK developed in emergent pro-
cesses of interaction between Grundfos LIFELINK and other parts of
the Grundfos organization and its environment.
The analysis of the empirical material has developed iteratively.
We ordered events chronologically as a sequence of events and activ-
ities that occur over time to identify changes in interpretations and
their effect on the negotiations of meaning. We identified several
important events and activities in the development of Grundfos
LIFELINK (see Figure 1), beginning with the decision to set up a tem-
porary task force. It became increasingly clear that the New Business
F IGURE 1 Overview of the wayfaring process
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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Board (represented by the blue line) and the operational team in
Grundfos LIFELINK (represented by the red line) viewed the progress
differently. Furthermore, we could attribute this to the operational
team's different experiences with developing the business model and
on the ground in Kenya. To make sense of these differences, our
attention turned to the strategy as practice literature with the distinc-
tion between the building and dwelling modes to the strategy being
particularly useful.
We have coded all data and data-triangulated interviews with the
documentary materials; we have followed the procedure of open cod-
ing and constant comparison, as suggested by Strauss and Cor-
bin (1990), building from initial descriptive codes. In alignment with
Kaplan's (2011) notion of PowerPoint presentations as a central
device in the epistemic machinery of strategy making in organizations,
a key focus in the analysis was to carefully examine PowerPoint pre-
sentations at internal board meetings as critical events in the develop-
ment of the Grundfos LIFELINK strategy and use these in the coding.
There were seven such meetings in 20 months (2007–2008), as
shown on the left-hand side of Figure 1. We gathered decision notes
and PowerPoint slides from these meetings, as well as several internal
memos, exchanged among participants to identify discussions. We
analyzed the interviews and matched the managers' recollection of
the events with the PowerPoint slides and notes presented. We used
the issues from the PowerPoint slides, analyzed the interviews, and
matched the managers' recollection of the events with the
PowerPoint slides presented.
We took inspiration from the stepwise procedure for develop-
ing a data structure suggested by Corley and Gioia (2004). We
searched for first-order concepts and merged them into second-
order themes through a process of iteration and recombinations,
paying heed to the time dimension in the dataset, as concepts
from previous meetings and memos layered and reappeared in
new conversations.
We examined the identified themes, looking for the PowerPoint
author's framing of particular issues, to convey particular meanings
and maintain legitimacy despite diversions from the original map. We
identified 14 themes, of which three are seen as encompassing sev-
eral of the other issues and as particularly critical for understanding
the role of bridging between “the wayfarers” and “the people who
stayed behind.” These themes are as follows: (i) changing the water
source, (ii) developing the payment system, and (iii) Grundfos LIFE-
LINK's role in the market.
Iterating between our data and the BoP and strategy literature
suggested to us that the tension between strategy as wayfaring and
navigating was the most useful device for understanding the unfolding
strategy process (see Figure 2). Hence, this concept became central in
our study on this topic. We subsequently used this to zoom in and
unfold the strategizing processes in Grundfos.
4 | FINDING THE WAY: THE GRUNDFOS
LIFELINK PROJECT
4.1 | Inception
The CEO of Grundfos developed the idea of what would become
Grundfos LIFELINK during a visit to a charity program in Thailand. As
he visited sponsor projects in the rural areas of Thailand in 2007, he
was struck by what he saw as a paradox: drinking water was a scarce
resource, but at the same time, many villages were situated near a
freshwater reserve, for example, a river. It seemed that a simple solu-
tion was evident, where well-known technologies could be combined
F IGURE 2 Interpretive scheme: linking parallel strategic activities and approaches in the development of strategy [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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to pump and purify water from the river. He emailed the head of the
New Business Development (NBD) division of Grundfos, asking him
to explore commercial possibilities for providing a solution based on
combining existing elements. This division was established 2 years
before generating new ideas and concepts for system solutions, cen-
tral for Grundfos's strategy to become the leading provider of sustain-
able water technology systems. The head of NBD's immediate
response was that this was certainly doable. Such a system could be
organized around standard components available on the market. In
addition, he considered that there were synergies to other product
development projects that Grundfos was working with at the time.
Organizing a user interface and a feasible way to profit from a busi-
ness model around the service and maintenance of the system in a
developing country context was the real challenge. He wrote to the
Grundfos CEO: “The market is created and organized by NGOs [non-
governmental organizations], national aid programs and other actors.
We work with them already, but we still have a lot to learn.” The NBD
head pointed out that he had contacts with a relevant supplier of the
water purification unit. The CEO replied, “Fine. Please provide a plan.”
NBD conducted an initial feasibility study that could provide
some background and a plan for further investments into the project.
From its inception, the project was meant to be a joint venture
between Grundfos and the manufacturer of the water purification
system. The report concluded that the task was well within the com-
petences of Grundfos and their possible partners. Most components
were already available. For instance, a water purification system that
was able to handle large volumes of water was available from H2O—a
start-up firm that had earlier showcased a system for water purifica-
tion. However, the commercial aspects of the project were uncharted
territory and would be needing most of the exploration and
conceptualization work.
The team presented their work at a meeting of the New Business
Board on March 23, 2007. In the presentation, several ambitions and
elements were identified that became the strategic themes directing
the further search process and the ensuing strategic process. First, the
theme concerning the project and potential value streams was
couched in BoP rhetoric. From the BoP perspective, Grundfos saw a
huge market potential. As stated in the PowerPoint presentation to
the New Business Board:
[Our Aim is] to raise conditions of life for the rural
population—bring growth to consumers and earn
money … target the BoP (people with less than $2 a
day).
Furthermore, keeping development costs to a minimum by using
as many existing components as possible was discussed. The first
meeting clarified that several issues remained to be investigated and
discussed with the New Business Board.
Another strategic theme identified at the first meeting con-
cerned the operation and maintenance issue. In the initial mail cor-
respondence, the head of NBD and CEO saw this issue as a
potential risk factor that had to be taken care of in the project. In
the first meeting, the project aimed to “establish a value chain that
includes supervision and training of local operators, bi-annual
exchange of units, monitoring water quality.” One way of doing this
was to black-box technology. Black-boxing would ensure that it
could not be tampered with by unauthorized persons. At the same
time, the team discussed how to establish satellite-based surveil-
lance of the system so that a local team of skilled persons would be
able to fix the system using proper (i.e., Grundfos) components. The
presentation was an initial attempt to develop a proposal reflecting
Grundfos's strategy and describing the logic of the proposed ven-
ture, the way it was to operate, and how it was supposed to create
value for its stakeholders. Discussing this phase in the development
process in an interview, the head of NBD later reflected: “You can
only ask questions based on what you ‘know’ you don't know. You
are blind to the issues that you ‘don't know’ you don't know.”
The next meeting with the New Business Board was held
2 months after the first one. Here, the research team provided a more
precise market estimate of the market potential:
In five years, we aim to have 100,000 units running,
with 30 million transactions and a daily turnover of
DKK 24 million.
This number reflected two important aspects of the context,
which were as follows: Grundfos's ambitious growth plans and the
explosive growth in the number of mobile phones used as payment
devices in Africa. Collecting the local payments for water credits
presented a critical challenge. Therefore, in this second board meet-
ing, the development of a payment system based on mobile phones
became an important theme. It was realized that such a system
would call for some development efforts. The team had browsed
the Internet and had accidentally determined that Safari.com, a
mobile phone operator based in Kenya, had a successful mobile
banking solution for micropayments—the M-Pesa payment system.
A large proportion of the poorest part of the population in Kenya
owned or had access to a mobile phone and used it for a broad
range of purposes. The team considered that, if they used M-Pesa
for water payments and linked the local water kiosks in the villages
to the Internet to monitor water use, it would be possible to match
usage with the payments made:
The use of mobile phones in Kenya was advanced
beyond any mobile payment system we knew. We
learned that farmers use mobile phones to find the
best market prices for their cattle. We were not aware
that such a thing existed. This kind of idea often does
not surface from a thorough analytical process but is
the consequence of frustration, pondering, luck, and
coincidence. (Head of NBD)
Using the M-Pesa system would reduce the perceived risk greatly
and help Grundfos identify a viable business partner in their target
market. A PowerPoint slide from the second board meeting explains
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the concept and further fleshes out the business model and Grun-
dfos's role in the value creation process:
Grundfos assembles units and supplies units to a local
organization in the country … [the] local organization
trains all levels of operators … units are hooked up by
local operator or Grundfos BoP Water Staff … mobile
operators administer the accounts … Mobile operator
supplies data to Grundfos.
The background for this early draft of a business model was to be
found in the team's work. It was becoming clear that the individual
payments for water would be relatively small and hard to collect and
transfer.
4.2 | The Grundfos LIFELINK team is established
The New Business Board finally provided a “go” for the system at a
meeting in June 2007. The plan was that 10 units should be in opera-
tion for field-testing in the period of 2007–2008 and then to scale up
to 100 units in 2009. Once the test period was over, 20,000 units
should be put into operation each year thereafter, following the pene-
tration of mobile phones in other African countries. With the board's
support, New Business started hiring people to implement the system
and establish what later was renamed Grundfos LIFELINK as a legal
entity and spin-off. The new team comprised three people: An opera-
tions manager was recruited internally and had extensive experience
working in Africa with the charity operations of Grundfos, whereas
two others were hired from external positions, including a general
manager and a technical manager.
The members of the LIFELINK team worked on developing the
business model. They traveled to Kenya and met with local and global
partners, and so on. The development team started handing over the
project to the new team. The process of taking over the project and
fleshing it out represented a separate journey. This process of making
sense of the initial plans and building on these plans marks the initia-
tion of the wayfaring team's journey, as they started to inhabit the
space and make it their own.
4.3 | Challenging the purification system
After reviewing the tests that had been conducted, the new LIFELINK
team realized that the purification system was not performing as
intended. The performance problems were related to the state of the
water source. African river water is considerably dirtier than Danish
surface water is; it carries with it a lot of particles, as well as antibiotic
sediments. In addition, larger pieces of wood, debris, and different
types of sediments are prone to wreck the purification system, calling
for constant maintenance. As an effect, the system clotted constantly
and did not live up to the “minimal local maintenance” notion formu-
lated in the original strategy document. Although other water sources,
such as groundwater, were available, purifying surface water was seen
as a key element in the original business idea. After much discussion
and argumentation across the Grundfos LIFELINK board, it was
decided to continue the development of the LIFELINK project inter-
nally and use groundwater as the water source. At the board meeting
in November 2007, this was presented by the Grundfos LIFELINK
team together with a slight but important suggestion for a shift in the
vision statement—from focusing on water purification to providing
clean drinking water to the rural population. A purification unit was to
be added to the pump later, when a feasible solution was found; this
would possibly be internally developed. For the team, this meant that
resources could be focused elsewhere:
Even though this deviated from our original plan, we
still saw it as a feasible strategy, as we could develop
the project and learn from using groundwater. We had
to convince some members of the board, though.
(Head of NBD)
In 2008, LIFELINK moved further away from purification as the
main source. Based on a study of current technologies for water puri-
fication, the following conclusion was presented during a meeting in
August 2008:
Adding purification modules to Grundfos LIFELINK
products adds complexity and cost to the water supply
system in terms of initial cost, additives and mainte-
nance – [The first] choice of water source must always
be non-polluted groundwater and to protect the
groundwater source from being contaminated – [The
second] choice must be investigating the opportunities
to drill a new borehole containing non-polluted
groundwater – In areas with water scarcity, polluted
ground and surface water might be the only and third
choice with the need of adding purification modules to
the water supply unit.
4.4 | Developing the payment system
Another pressing problem was how to further develop a workable
payment system from the ideas provided by the feasibility study. The
original idea involved M-Pesa, the mobile phone-based money trans-
fer and payment system. M-Pesa users can use their account to
deposit and withdraw money from a network of banking agents.
These agents include airtime resellers and various retail outlets in local
communities. At the time, the M-Pesa system was estimated to pro-
cess as much as 10% of Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP). There
were several problems with M-Pesa. For instance, it was not clear
how delays in receiving a short message service (SMS) text would
affect the system and in what way it could sort out how to transfer
water-drawing credits to a user. The technical manager interviewed
local providers of e-banking solutions in Kenya. He learned that an
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important cost driver was the “infomediaries” standing between the
user and the phone companies, and they were responsible for sorting
out SMS text messages from users and connecting them to mobile
operators. The development team contacted Safari.com, which was
interested in discussing the development of a dedicated payment sys-
tem for LIFELINK. Safari.com saw interesting perspectives in
codesigning this system because of the potential volume of data traf-
fic, as well as for participating in its design, which could be useful for
developing a new service to be sold to other utility service providers,
such as electricity companies. However, also seeing the commercial
potential of this system, the LIFELINK team decided that they also
wanted a part of it. Therefore, LIFELINK involved more of Grundfos's
internal engineering and development capacity. Consequently, they
back-sourced large parts of the development tasks.
A new problem surfaced for payments. As the individual minimum
transaction for buying water credits was kept relatively low so that
people could afford to buy water in small quantities, the individual
SMS charge was substantial in comparison. Initially, the SMS price
was KES50 for transferring KES100 of water credits. The LIFELINK
team and Safari.com agreed to lower the price to KES15 per SMS.
The development team decided to add a layer to the system so that
bulk purchases of water credits could be conducted through the M-
Pesa system but could then be banked at the Grundfos server and
transferred to users in smaller amounts by loading a key fob (a small
hardware device with built-in authentication mechanisms and mem-
ory) with credits. Another reason for this additional layer was to
ensure access to the system for users who did not own mobile
phones. Although mobile phones are widely distributed in Kenya, not
everyone would necessarily own one. This new layer would allow
users to buy water credits collectively, paying only one SMS fee.
Later, payment could be divided among the users:
At that time, we saw it as a rocket launcher system,
where the purpose of the M-Pesa–based system was
to carry our extension of the system to the local users.
We are now using this system to develop an alterna-
tive that can be used when we enter new markets
where mobile ownership is less common. (Project
manager)
This system later developed into AQtap, a stand-alone service
system marketed toward infrastructure providers as a water ATM.
4.5 | Changing Grundfos' role in the market
In June 2008, a plane left Denmark for Kenya with supplies for build-
ing 20 water kiosks. LIFELINK was using Grundfos's existing distribu-
tor in Kenya as a partner for field testing the equipment. Grundfos
had formed an agreement with a small local NGO with local knowl-
edge and several local operations in rural Kenya. In the original plan
for the rollout, the NGO's task was to find suitable villages and negoti-
ate the terms with local authorities using its established goodwill.
Grundfos and a local dealer would be responsible for constructing the
site once an agreement was reached.
Grundfos planned for LIFELINK to work with five different mar-
ket segments, which were as follows: farms and game reserves, small-
scale agriculture, small rural centers, semi-pastoralists, and pastoral-
ists. The team planned to expand toTanzania and Uganda in 2009 and
to Zambia, Malawi, and South Africa in 2010. However, over the next
8 months, little happened. At the board meeting in June 2008, it was
decided to change the name of the company to LIFELINK. Changing
the name and linking LIFELINK specifically to Grundfos in the visual
presentation of the LIFELINK logo reflected the strategic progress
made on two accounts. First, the process led to the realization that
the payment system was the most promising aspect of the project. As
stated at the board meeting memos, having the project “associated
with a range of future business possibilities—not just sun and water”
had become important. Second, explicating the association with a
respected company was given priority—with the realization that the
water kiosks needed additional external funding if they were to
become a success.
The second decision was to outplace a local operations manager
Kenya for 6 months to further push the testing and rollout process.
His job was to find 20 suitable sites and finalize agreements with local
communities. Although the NGO had developed a list of villages it
thought were suitable, closer inspection showed that most of the vil-
lages suggested were not fit candidates for the program. Thus, this
was a period of frustration for both LIFELINK management and Grun-
dfos. Grundfos LIFELINK management had to acknowledge that sev-
eral of the assumptions they had built their strategy on were
inaccurate. In particular, they had miscalculated the interests of the
NGO in the process. The NGO was primarily concerned with its aid
programs; they saw Grundfos as a potential contributor to these pro-
grams rather than the other way around. They had already established
programs in some villages, and their choice of potential villages for
the Grundfos LIFELINK project was strongly biased by their current
operations. These rural villages or even whole areas often lacked the
basics needed for operating the system. Some had no capital flows or
mobile telephones, and they had insufficient cattle holding or agricul-
tural activity in need of a water supply. Furthermore, these villages
often lacked a borehole.
4.6 | A change of approach in strategizing efforts
By November 2008, Grundfos LIFELINK management had no operat-
ing sites in any villages, only several failed negotiations with villages
that were not suited for the project. The LIFELINK managers realized
that they needed to take a more active role in the location of sites
and the negotiation of the agreements with the local villages:
Teaming up with a local NGO was a great mistake from
our side. We knew very little about BoP markets and
had no concepts to grasp the local market conditions
in rural areas, but we believed that our knowledge
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from servicing hotels and other more economically
advanced customers in Kenya would be useful to
us. Like everybody else from our part of the world, we
teamed up with the local NGO experts and explained
our purpose—to erect 20 commercially operated test
sites—and then left it to them. … We learned that there
are many agendas and that a clear division of work
between us and the NGO was not possible. We
learned that, as a BoP operator, you need to control all
activities and enroll people in your design, rather than
linking to existing systems, as they seldom serve your
interests. (General manager, LIFELINK)
A new approach was needed. Extending control over activities
like sales, lease agreements, and negotiations with the local telecom
operator necessitated a subsidiary in Kenya. Grundfos LIFELINK had
established a subsidiary, and with it, a new sales organization, situated
in Nairobi and headed by a newly appointed manager. His job was to
focus directly on the regional water boards to find a suitable partner.
The water boards had funding to support water supply initiatives in
the local villages. A second source of funding was the Danish Embassy
in Nairobi. LIFELINK also decided to replace the NGO as the go-
between to the villages and, instead, hired two anthropologists to
conduct research in the villages to understand consumption patterns
better; they would offer insights to help Grundfos profile the potential
customer villages:
The big problem that LIFELINK experienced at the time
was identifying the relevant villages and how to
approach them. This was primarily the headache of our
CEO and our local community consultant. From what
we learned in Katitika, however, we soon discovered
another serious challenge: The agreed price for water
was simply too high, and it was unlikely that village
inhabitants would ever pay 5 shillings per jerry can,
since the perceived ‘normal’ price for water in a public
‘water kiosk’ is 2–3 Kenyan shillings per jerry can. Fur-
thermore, the water consumption was much less than
what had previously been expected. (New Business
Developer)
This made it clear to the LIFELINK team that the commercial
funding model would never be the primary one. Instead, LIFELINK
management saw a different perspective for establishing their water
kiosk. An important lesson learned was that it was necessary to alter
the financing scheme. Rather than looking for prospective customers
for LIFELINK, they needed to think of the water kiosk as an entrepre-
neurial project. Rather than thinking about how to bring the kiosk to
the village and make users pay for their current consumption, their
focus should be on how the kiosk could generate local growth once
there. With the new approach, LIFELINK could be seen as a commu-
nity development platform that could attract other organizations and
NGOs. In this sense, the focus had drifted away from the original idea,
but it was still aligned with the notion of Grundfos as a system and
service provider connected to water technology and the NBD division
as the innovative explorer of such possibilities.
From the onset, the business contract was imagined and con-
structed as an agreement with the local community. The surplus gen-
erated from the daily payments for water was supposed to finance a
loan taken out by the community. Once it was realized that five shil-
lings was an unrealistic price, it was also clear that this model would
fail. Other sources of revenue needed to be looked for to finance at
least the initial investment, to complement what became labeled as
the “commercial model.” One new model developed was based on
donations: NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and others could
finance the system, and only the service contracting costs would be
paid through the user fee. A second model was a semi-commercial
model that mixed community user fees with donations from donors,
such as government, regional development banks, or the World Bank.
With the semi-commercial model and donation model, Grundfos again
changed their focus. It became increasingly important to attract funds
from donors with interest in developing countries, as well as to raise
funds through other means. Notes from the board meeting in June
and the extraordinary meeting in August 2008 reflect this. Documen-
tation of the sustainability of LIFELINK became even more critical
than before. It was now at the core in raising more capital for the
water kiosks. The local consultants developed a procedure for negoti-
ating with the local communities and evaluating the impact of the
water kiosks. Following this procedure, a baseline study was con-
ducted, starting with an overall assessment of the local village, which
has become a standard procedure in Grundfos LIFELINK's business
opportunity assessment activities. This study was to be followed up
by an impact study after 18 months of operation and used as docu-
mentation and potential validation of the health effects of establishing
a water kiosk.
Eventually, as the complexity around initiating and managing
operations grew, activities did not scale up as intended, and following
a change in top management at Grundfos, they discontinued the
LIFELINK project. NBD management had reached the conclusion that,
although LIFELINK was showing signs of making an operating profit, it
was becoming comprehensive in scope and too far removed from
Grundfos's other business activities. This would make scaling of the
business model extremely difficult. During an interview, one manager
pointed out that marketing LIFELINK in other countries would call for
a reorganization of the subsidiaries in Grundfos, given the very differ-
ent approaches, incentive models, timelines, and milestones needed
for successful rollout in the organization.
5 | ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The case of Grundfos LIFELINK demonstrates that entering a BoP
market represents a challenge for the strategic planning and manage-
ment activities of MNCs. With the LIFELINK project, Grundfos set out
to “do good” by delivering safe, fresh water to poor rural
communities—and hoped to “do well” in the process of tapping into
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the opportunity it saw at the BoP (Prahalad, 2004). However, as many
other MNCs have also found (Hart et al., 2016), “doing well by doing
good” was not as straightforward as Grundfos initially expected. The
realization that Grundfos was moving into entirely new business areas
with correspondingly new demands for capabilities and skillsets even-
tually led to the discontinuation of LIFELINK as an independent busi-
ness unit. This conclusion plays into the ongoing discussion
concerning whether MNCs must reinvent themselves and engage in
cocreating the market space to successfully integrate SDG targets into
their strategizing efforts toward BoP contexts (Ausrød, Sinha, &
Widding, 2017). Kolk and Pinkse (2008, pp. 1359–1360) write:
The extent to which MNEs [multinational enterprises]
are also taking the responsibility to become agents of
global change that tackle sustainability issues is still
highly debated. … But do MNEs also take the effort to
invest in sustainable technologies, and if so how far are
they willing to go, if this also means moving away from
technologies they are familiar with?
Although the SDGs had not been formulated when the Grundfos
LIFELINK project was launched, Grundfos linked the LIFELINK project
to the SDG goals. LIFELINK contributes to the target of achieving uni-
versal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for
all by 2030 (SDG target 6.1). Initially, Grundfos tried to solve the
problem of providing safe drinking water to local communities by
building on familiar technologies, working with established business
partners, and collaborating with an NGO to help identify suitable vil-
lages and negotiate terms with local authorities. Using civic sector
organizations as intermediaries is common in BoP environments, as it
can help bridge institutional voids (Gold, Chowdhury, Huq, &
Heinemann, 2019; Heuer et al., 2020; Schuster & Holtbrügge, 2014),
but Grundfos's experience underscores that companies should think
carefully about which civic sector organizations they collaborate with.
Once it became clear that the initial approach was not sufficient,
Grundfos looked beyond familiar technologies and partners and was
able to develop a novel business model. However, this turned out to
be too radical for the rest of the organization. Although not a com-
mercial success when viewed in isolation, the LIFELINK project has
nevertheless contributed to Grundfos's ongoing transformation and
supports the journey toward being a contributor to the SDG goals, as
also explained by the current CEO of Grundfos, Mads Nipper, when
addressing the UN leaders' summit (https://youtu.be/HElFEBcDDWI).
In this sense, Grundfos fits the character of an MNC “trailblazer” in
relation to its environmental efforts (Shah & Arjoon, 2015). The case
study suggests that the development of value creation practices in
BoP contexts involving local stakeholders, for example, in the shape
of payment systems, must also consider alignment with global value
creation practices toward other stakeholders, such as funding agen-
cies. In this sense, our case suggests that the shaping of markets also
entails alignment and interconnection of market actors.
With the LIFELINK project, Grundfos entered uncharted territory.
In line with the building approach to strategizing (Chia & Holt, 2009),
Grundfos started by defining a destination and tried to make a map
containing navigational details in the shape of project milestones and
other signposts intended to signal the progress made. Grundfos's
standard approach to strategizing is one of careful strategic planning
and control, and in line with the company, it initially developed a plan
that reflected best practices of the planning and design school within
strategic management (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998). The
process began after Grundfos CEO Niels Due Jensen identified a
potential opportunity for creating a profitable business delivering safe
freshwater in BoP markets, although the opportunity identification
occurred somewhat serendipitously. Grundfos's New Business divi-
sion then began a navigational process where they tried to analyze
the market potential and develop an economically viable strategy for
providing safe drinking water to small communities. The market analy-
sis was based on maps representing the “topology” of the environ-
ment to be mastered. Thus, Grundfos had a clear purpose in mind for
its activities. The clarity of purpose and the restricted tolerance
toward deviation from established procedures when facing
uncontested strategic terrain reflects the inherent MNC problems of
translating between strategy implementation and strategy formulation
in complicated organizational settings, as discussed by Olsen and
Boxenbaum (2009) and expanded on in this work. The New Business
Board engaged in a dialogue and successfully transitioned from a nar-
row conception of business opportunities into a broader one, devel-
oping several innovative solutions to the problems encountered.
Some of these have turned into generic skills, such as the AQtap, a
water ATM usage monitoring and payment system that is now
marketed by Grundfos as a standalone solution for ensuring transpar-
ent payment systems. However, in doing so, they also participated in
gradually transforming the operational model of Grundfos LIFELINK
to the extent that it no longer fit with the rest of the Grundfos
organization.
Having designed a strategy, Grundfos LIFELINK set about
implementing it. However, as the LIFELINK wayfaring team began to
engage with their environment and interacted with other actors in it,
the building approach fell short. Among other things, the planned
route for arriving at the destination proved treacherous because the
NGO with which Grundfos had become entangled did not perform as
hoped. Therefore, Grundfos disengaged from the NGO and began to
explore other ways of going forward, acting purposively rather than
with a clear purpose in mind (Chia & Holt, 2009). As the project cham-
pions responsible for the implementation of the strategy engaged
with the local environment in Kenya, they stopped being travelers
going from A to B and instead became wayfarers who actively
engaged with their environment. In the process, the activities of the
Grundfos LIFELINK team began to diverge from the original plan, and
they ended up obscuring the original target. Consequently, their per-
spectives and aspirations regarding the project began to differ from
those communicated initially and held by their superiors on the New
Business Board. As a consequence, a new dynamic unfolded between
the Grundfos LIFELINK team experiencing and exploring the possibili-
ties of the tricky terrain first-hand and the New Business Board,
which remained remote and asynchronic in time and space. The
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LIFELINK team rethought and represented the strategic intent to
stakeholders in a manner that tied in with the original purpose, and
thus, legitimized project continuation. At the same time, they worked
to modify it so what constituted success or failure was changed and
aligned with their ongoing experiences. This process of strategic cop-
ing through alignment over time is an exciting addition to the discus-
sion of wayfaring.
As illustrated above, Grundfos LIFELINK has followed a long and
complicated route from initiation to realization; thus, it provides an
excellent empirical backdrop for investigating the strategy work
involved in the interaction between the activities related to designing,
planning, and implementing a strategy in a BoP context. Individuals
come to know others in their social worlds by being attentive and
responsive to the subtle cues that reveal the nuances of their relation-
ships toward them (Ingold, 1993). Learning is less about developing
schemas for constructing the environment than engaging with its vari-
ous constituents (Ingold, 2000).
Although Grundfos LIFELINK started out using a building
approach to strategy, it abandoned this and instead embarked on stra-
tegic wayfaring, trying to gain experience with the terrain and working
more closely with other actors. The change in direction was not the
result of a conscious, strategic decision, but rather occurred incremen-
tally as key personnel developed experience with the environment
through their everyday coping efforts. To facilitate this wayfaring pro-
cess, Grundfos hired an anthropologist to help the firm develop a
good understanding of what the target market wanted and was willing
to pay for safe water. Thus, members of the wayfaring team demon-
strated a willingness to experience and be exposed to the environ-
ment, to feel unguided and to step beyond the comforts of
established plans and safe environments.
That the building approach fell short created tensions and chal-
lenges that lasted throughout the period studied, which the LIFELINK
team tried to resolve through recurring sketch mapping efforts
(Ingold, 2007; Wood, 1993a,b). The LIFELINK team succeeded in con-
vincing the LIFELINK board to change the strategic approach; thus,
they were able to morph into a dwelling mode where the initial aspira-
tions and milestones used to evaluate the soundness of the project
were downgraded compared with the learning and development pos-
sibilities that emerged.
The case demonstrates that understanding the environment and
developing an appropriate strategy is inherently social, as actors tell
stories about their experiences to each other and develop a shared,
transitory understanding of the territory and determine how to go on
(Shotter, 2008). The Grundfos LIFELINK team together with the New
Business Board weaved a strategy that allowed them to develop a
strategic direction that reflected the experience Grundfos LIFELINK
employees gained through active engagement with the environment
more than Grundfos's initial intentions. We think that it was the ability
to link these new experiences with the original aims of the project
that helped this transition take place, as well as having the support
from the board throughout the transformation. There is no detached
view from which to view the environment—it can only be experienced
from within, by being thrown into the thick of it.
Another important observation is acknowledging the starting
point of the journey, in our case, the role of the initial map in creat-
ing rigidity for the wayfaring process. The ideas initially sketched
and the detailing of milestones differ in importance and quality for
the people involved in the wayfaring process (the Grundfos
LIFELINK team and particularly the people that went to Kenya) and
those staying behind (specifically the New Business Board). For the
latter group, the initial ideas remained essential reference points
and were used to understand the means-ends logic of the steps
taken to reach the destination originally envisioned and to evaluate
the progress of the project. However, for the former group, the
milestones changed in meaning as they experienced and molded the
environment through which they were traveling. Some aspects of
the strategy were discarded outright, whereas other aspects chan-
ged in meaning. The changes included what the objective should be,
who should be involved, and how value should be created. To con-
vince the New Business Board, the LIFELINK team resorted to using
existing internal measurements and objectives in the Grundfos new
business strategy focus to justify the project and avoid project clo-
sure (Halme et al., 2012; Olsen & Boxenbaum, 2009).
In the case of Grundfos LIFELINK, the board of the parent com-
pany and the managers directly involved set out with a plan for
how to enter the market, but the managers who developed direct
experience with the environment soon realized that the assumptions
on which this plan was founded were seriously flawed. They began
a process of readjustment or reweaving of the strategy in practical
engagement with the environment they were now part of. At the
same time, they had to secure continued support from a CEO and
board that did not have this experience. Strategy praxis has an ele-
ment of a performance, where actors have to perform to be persua-
sive. Comparing PowerPoint presentations from the board meetings
over time provides an interesting dimension to the journey and the
attempts to bridge the diverging path that the local LIFELINK team
took. The LIFELINK team did not place new information into an
overall classificatory scheme, but instead, a scheme emerged from
the stories they told. It was through the crafting of the narratives
that the managers in control of resources were convinced. The
PowerPoint presentations are consistent and address milestones
and concerns of the initial group, but they were used to highlight
newly discovered opportunities rather than ponder failed or missed
milestones. In this sense, they also testify to the divergences of the
route made and discontinuous breaks from presentation to presen-
tation that were not made explicit to the board.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Little is known about how MNCs contribute to meeting the UN's
SDGs (Witte & Dilyard, 2017). This explorative study of Grundfos
LIFELINK demonstrates the importance of intimate engagement
with the context of strategic action and the dangers for MNCs of
trying to replicate or impose an existing business model when
entering new and radically different markets in BoP contexts to
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address a key sustainable development issue—providing access to
safe drinking water.
If Grundfos had followed the approach suggested by Seelos and
Mair (2007) with LIFELINK and tried to leverage its existing resources
and competences, it would have continued to focus on water pumps
and adjacent services. By abandoning a formalistic approach to strate-
gic planning and management, developing the Grundfos LIFELINK
business model represents a purposive practical accomplishment that
has contributed to providing access to clean drinking water for nearly
100,000 people in local communities in Kenya (Grundfos, 2020b). The
managers and board of Grundfos set out with what they saw as a clear
understanding (or map) of the territory to be navigated. The making of
this map was rooted in the parent firm's core understandings of pump
technology application in the economically mature economy. It consis-
tently underplayed the differences related to the natural and sociocul-
tural environment. The managers involved soon discovered that their
map was of little use to them because it was impossible to travel for-
ward along the road that it suggested. Instead, they began to explore
the natural and social environment that they were now part of. Rather
than try to repair a faulty map or make a new map, they were mapping
(Ingold, 2000). This is crucial, as mapping draws meaning from the
communicative contexts of its enactment and changes direction
accordingly, whereas map making is an inscriptive practice of engaging
with the environment. Mapping also suggests a broadened awareness,
where issues (e.g., the state of the water quality and the boreholes,
the road infrastructure, Wi-Fi connections, and other aspects of the
environment) enter into the strategy maker's consideration.
These concerns echo previous debates over strategy processes.
The learning school of strategic management discarded the overly
rationalistic assumptions of the so-called strategic planning school
long ago (Mintzberg et al., 1998), and instead, envisaged strategy
formation as an emerging process (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
According to this perspective, realized strategies (understood as
consistency in action over time) can emerge unintentionally in
response to an evolving situation. Emergence implies learning what
works, as one step is taken at a time in search of a viable pattern
of action (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). However, the learning school
is not clear about the specific processes through which strategies
emerge. We think that the strategy-as-wayfaring perspective devel-
oped here provides a framework addressing the processes through
which strategic intent and experience converge into realized strate-
gic actions—particularly when many environmental elements are
alien to the organization.
There is a growing interest in the micro-foundations of strategy
making (e.g., Hendry, 2000; Whittington, 1996). Researchers strive to
be closer to the world of practitioners and their concrete activities
while acknowledging that strategy work and the outcomes of the
resulting strategies rely on broader organizational and institutional
practices (Vaara & Whittington, 2012). Practices often include strate-
gic documents, such as strategy plans, but rather than assuming these
plans to control and guide actions, some stakeholders use them in
their attempt to legitimize their actions and to discipline particular
actions of other stakeholders (Mantere & Vaara, 2008). The study
contributes to the BoP strategy literature by demonstrating the inter-
relationship between different levels of analysis, the individual man-
ager, the firm (micro-context), and the environment (macro-context).
Second, our paper deals with contextual emergence, which Vaara and
Whittington (2012) identified as an essential topic for strategy
research. Thus, the paper provides empirical support to the notion
that strategies are not designed to meet the needs of BoP environ-
ments but must be weaved in a cocreative process mobilizing and
involving the local context if they are to succeed. In this sense, the
case supports the notion that business activities imposed on a com-
plex or even “hostile” environment must not be too rigid in its
demands to this context. Instead, it must maintain elements of adapt-
ability, flexibility, and responsiveness.
The importance of engaging with both the natural and social envi-
ronment is clear from the case of Grundfos LIFELINK. It is through
active engagement with the environment that MNCs can test, discard,
adopt, and develop strategies, and through this, firms change.
There are limitations to our study as well. It is based on a single
case, primarily seen from the perspective of the MNC and one specific
BoP context. This fact restrains the empirical generalizability of our
findings. As already pointed out, explorative case studies are made for
different purposes. They detailed understandings on how and why
issues, rather than questions about how much and how many
(Yin, 2015). In our case, we think that a detailed view into the
decision-making processes of strategy teams engaged in BoP strate-
gizing is useful for practice and research.
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